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Funderburk: Best Interest of the Child Should Not Be an Ambiguous Term

Best Interest of the Child Should Not Be an
Ambiguous Term
Judge Carl Funderburk ∗
I. Introduction
There is no possible way to determine on any given day of the
week the number of court rulings that affect children. In every state’s
juvenile and family court systems, the “best interest of the child”
standard is used to protect children, but there is no concrete definition
of this elusive standard. 1 The “best interest of the child” is a noble
concept, yet it is unbelievably complicated to define, and even more
difficult to put into practice. 2 The notion of “best interest” does not
lead to a neutral investigation that points to an obvious result. The
“best interest” standard involves decision makers who are interested
in the best outcome for children. Each decision maker, however,
comes with his or her own set of values, thoughts, and practices
regarding child-rearing, and may never see the child whom their
decisions affect. Ask anyone who deals with children within the legal
system what “best interest” is, and often they will respond, “whatever
*

Special Judge Carl Funderburk currently serves on the domestic bench in Tulsa,
Oklahoma. He has served as Special Judge on the domestic bench for five years
and previously as Special Judge and Referee on the juvenile bench for six years. He
has been a guest lecturer for undergraduate law classes as well as continuing legal
education courses for lawyers. Judge Carl Funderburk was honored as the
“Outstanding Family Law Judge” for Oklahoma in 2011. He graduated from the
University of Tulsa Law School in 1993 with a Juris Doctorate and from Oklahoma
State University in 1980 with a B.A. in Humanities. In this Article, Judge
Funderburk provides analytical exposition based, in part, on his experience on the
bench and observations on how the “best interest” standard has been applied in
practice.
1
Raymie H. Wayne, The Best Interests of the Child: A Silent Standard – Will You
Know It When You Hear It?, 2 J. PUB. CHILD WELFARE 33, 34 (2008).
2
Dana E. Prescott, The AAML and a New Paradigm for “Thinking About” Child
Custody Litigation: The Next Half Century, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 107, 110
(2011).
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the judge says it is.” The intent of this Article is to propose a
structure in determining the definition of “best interest” within the
legal system and how the standard should be applied.
The discussion must first begin by explaining the authority of
the court, which must be determined in order to understand the
court’s boundaries. If the court only deals with rights, it stands to
reason that the best interest of the child equates to the rights of the
child. In applying and balancing the rights of the child, the court
should approach this in a common sense manner as set forth by
scholars Samantha Brennan and Robert Noggle. 3 This method
requires recognizing that children have rights 4 and those rights are
equal to the rights of adults. 5 However, the child’s rights are applied
in a more limited manner because of a child’s immaturity and
inability to knowingly exercise his or her rights. But once a child
matures, either demonstrated prior to reaching adulthood, or upon
reaching adulthood, the child is able to exercise their rights for
themselves. Until such time, the parents have oversight in protecting
their child’s rights. When the rights of the child begin to conflict with
the rights of the parents, the government may then step in and protect
the rights of the child as in the juvenile court system when a child is
removed from his or her parents after allegations of abuse or neglect.
This Article will argue that “best interest of the child” is the
constitutional right of the child. The court’s authority is found in
Article III of the U.S. Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789.
3

See generally Samantha Brennan & Robert Noggle, The Moral Status of
Children: Children’s Rights, Parents’ Rights, and Family Justice, 23 SOC. THEORY
& PRAC. 1 (1997) (observing that children are afforded the same rights that adults
have simply by virtue of being a person; therefore, children have the same moral
consideration as adults, although they can be treated differently from adults).
4
See, e.g., Matter of T.M.H., 613 P.2d 468 (Okla. 1980) (reasoning that where a
child is to be questioned, there is a requirement for a parent, guardian, attorney, or
legal custodian to be present, and the child shall be fully advised of his or her
constitutional and legal rights, including the right to be represented by an attorney);
see also N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
protects children from unreasonable search and seizures conducted by public
school officials); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (stating that juveniles have due
process rights against compulsory self-incrimination).
5
Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 22.
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Based upon this authority, all courts deal in the rights of the
individual. These rights are afforded to all individuals, demanding
the inclusion of the constitutional rights of the child when
interpreting the best interest of a child. The court, in applying the best
interest of the child, must therefore balance the constitutional rights
of the child against the constitutional rights of the parents. Where the
rights of the child are in conflict with the rights of the parent, the
court can limit the parental authority over how the parent raises the
child. 6
Part II of this Article posits that the term “best interest”
should not be ambiguous—as it is frequently described—and outlines
the steps to assist in defining the concept. Part III of this Article
argues that the authority of the court only deals with rights, excluding
the personal values, morals, and social bias of the judge. Part IV
argues that if the authority of the court is to deal in “rights,” then the
“best interest” of the child must be the rights of the child as opposed
to simply what is good for the child. Part V describes that the court
reconciles children having rights by recognizing that they are equal
rights as to all individuals. Part VI goes on to explain that while those
rights may be equal as to all individuals, they are limited during the
age of minority of the child. Finally, Part VII emphasizes that during
the age of minority, the government, in balancing the rights of the
child with those of the parent, may step in when the child’s rights
conflict with those of the parent.
II. Best Interest of The Child Should Not be an Ambiguous Term
“Best Interest of the child” is often quoted within the
hallowed halls of juvenile and domestic courtrooms. The term is
almost exclusively used when dealing with the care of children. 7 But
6

Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 631-32 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that parents have the
liberty right and obligation to raise and care for their children, which in turn serves
the interest of the children). It is not the role of the court system to interfere with
this right unless the actions of the parents rise to the level of abuse or neglect.
Skrapka v. Bonner, 187 P.3d 202, 214 (Okla. 2008). When the court is required to
7
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what exactly is the “best interest of the child”? Its definition, at best,
is ambiguous and left to be defined by that particular court. The term
often follows the findings and instructions from the court on the care
of a child. 8 “Best interest” becomes a term of art that justifies a
court’s order for certain conduct, or cessation of certain conduct, for
a child’s caregiver. 9 In the end, though, the best interest standard
should be less discretionary.
A. Defining “best interest”
“Best interest” should be interpreted as the constitutional right
of the child, equal to parental rights over that child, 10 with both rights
being applied in a limited manner and protected from governmental
intrusion by the court. “Best interest” should not be based upon the
government or court’s standards and values. 11 When this particular
term is used in court, it is common for individuals affected by it to
search for a definition or guideline for clarification. The court has
act in order to protect and care for children in place of their parents, it is to be
guided by the “best interest of the child.” Id. at 210.
8
For example, every finding involving children under Title 10A and Title 43 of the
Oklahoma Statutes require the court to make determinations in its rulings that they
are in the best interest of the children. The approach is consistent with those found
in other jurisdictions. See In re Foshee v. Foshee, 247 P.3d 1162, 1167 (Okla.
2010); Murrell v. Cox, 226 P.3d 692, 700 (Okla. 2009); In re M.W., 292 P.3d
1158, 1163 (Colo. App. 2012); Sparks v. Sparks, 75 So. 3d 861, 862 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2011); In re Welfare of the Child of D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 546 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2009); In re Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); Campise
v. Campise, 671 N.Y.S.2d 980, 981 (App. Div. 1998).
9
For example, in hearings to relocate with children, the court is to determine if the
request is made in good faith. If the request is made in good faith, then the burden
shifts to the non-relocating party to show it is not in the best interest of the
children. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112.3 (West 2013); In re Adoption of
C.A., 137 P.3d 318, 319 (Colo. 2006) (en banc); Fredman v. Fredman, 960 So. 2d
52, 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
10
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining
that when the rights of the child are in conflict with the rights of the parents, the
child’s rights should be protected first).
11
See Josh Gupta-Kagan, Children, Kin, and Court: Designing Third Party
Custody Policy to Protect Children, Third Parties, and Parents, 12 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 43, 95 (2008) (describing the vague, subjective application of
the “best interest” standard seen when a court awarded custody to a child’s
grandparents based on the “Bohemian lifestyle” of the child’s father).
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struggled in the past with defining terms and the exercise of
constitutional rights. Much like the term “obscenity” in 1964, the
“best interest of the child” standard is “subjective, difficult to
articulate, and differs based upon the unique facts of each case.” 12
Justice Stewart will always be remembered for his definition of
“obscenity” in Jacobellis v. Ohio, when he stated:
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of
material I understand to be embraced within that
shorthand description; and perhaps I could never
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I
see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is
not that. 13
After the ruling in Jacobellis, it took nine years for the definition of
obscenity to develop under the law, and for the courts to feel
compelled enough to establish a definition with the Miller test. 14
Today, however, we still do not have a working definition of “best
interest” as it relates to the precious lives of children and their
families.
The “best interest of the child” standard is still applied in an
“I know it when I see it” fashion. 15 In fact, “[t]he term is so difficult
to define that it has been omitted from the sixth edition of Black’s
Law Dictionary (1990) and from other reference tools designed to
translate the law from legalese to a common language understood by
those who are affected by the law.” 16 Further, “[t]he ‘best interest of
the child’ standard often operates as a fiction to soothe the
12

Wayne, supra note 1, at 36.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
14
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973) (finding obscenity is not
protected under the First Amendment and going on to define obscenity as when
“‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, . . . whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct . . . and . . .
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”).
15
Wayne, supra note 1, at 36.
16
Id.
13
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conscience of judges, lawyers, and parents who invoke it as a mantra
without meaning.” 17 This oft-quoted fiction is created by imposing
outside values into the family combined with the lack of a working
definition of “best interest.”
Essentially, all those courts that interact with children have a
tendency to overlook the fundamental rights of both the child and
parents when applying their own good judgment in the decision
making process. 18 A court’s order should contain more than, “I find it
in the best interest of the child” when ordering how the parent will or
will not perform his or her parental duties. There needs to be a
balancing of identified rights of both the parents and child. 19
B. Balancing the rights of parents against the rights of
children
Lawyers, parents, and social workers often argue that being in
the “best interest” of a child is what that person truly believes is good
for the child. Each person’s view of what is good for the child is as
diverse as the individuals involved. This concept of what is good for
the child is not synonymous with what is in the “best interest” of the
child. According to the U.S. Constitution, the court should not use
the standard that determines what is good for the child, but instead
should use the narrower standard that looks to what is in the “best
interest” of the child. In other words, “best interest” should protect
the rights of the child. 20 The court is only authorized to act based
upon the “best interest” of the child; it simply does not have the

17

Id. at 37.
Id. at 41 (describing the potential for abuse of the “best interest” standard based
on a judge’s lack of understanding of available community resources and the
complexity of the social problems affecting parties).
19
See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-1-102 (West 2013) (recognizing that parents
have a natural, legal, and moral right, as well as a duty, to care for and support their
children, that a child has a right to be raised free from physical and emotional abuse
or neglect, and that the State should only intervene when necessary to protect a
child from harm or threatened harm).
20
Due process protections preclude the State from exercising power over persons
without appropriate consideration of and preservation of an individual’s rights.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18
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authority to do what is basically good for the child. 21 What is “good”
for the child is a much more expansive idea than what is in the “best
interest” of a child. What is good for a child is subjective and
requires a value decision. Determining the “best interest” of a child
requires weighing and balancing the individual constitutional rights
of the parents and the child.
Part of the determination of what is good for the child
includes an application of a standard of care. Good is a relative term
whose weight can only be interpreted by the speaker. Therefore, it is
the speaker’s interpretation of good, and as such is the speaker’s
standard of good—meaning good care. But the question is, “whose
standard of good care should we use?” Often, it is the standard of
care of the court itself. 22 Imposing a standard of care does not require
a balancing of interests; it merely incorporates the values, thoughts,
and desires of the court. 23 This imposition of the court’s standard of
care upon the parents is paramount to governmental intrusion into
21

For example, it might be “good” for the court to act out of general concern for
the health of an overweight child where the parents were not taking action.
However, determining the “best interests” of the child would involve determining
the specific needs of the overweight child and whether the parents were attentive to
them, including any weight-related medical conditions. The court’s authority to
demand certain behaviors of the parents must be grounded in an objective
determination of the risks the child faces, not upon a subjective, value-based
reaction to what the judge thinks the parents are doing “wrong.”
22
Wayne, supra note 1, at 37. “The legal literature does not offer much guidance in
understanding the meaning of the best interests of the child as a legal standard.
One, perhaps cynical, author stated, ‘the best interests of the child standard often
operates as a fiction to soothe the conscience of judges, lawyers, and parents who
invoke it as a mantra without meaning.’” See also Nancy Neraas, Comment, The
Non-Lawyer Guardian Ad Litem in Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings: The
King County, Washington, Experience, 58 WASH. L. REV. 853, 867-68 (1983)
(stating that there is no consensus on the meaning of the term “best interests of the
child”). These articles represent popular beliefs that the standard is void of content.
23
A standard of care is subjective and based upon personal values and preferences
in how a child should be raised. It is possible for there to be as many as three
standards of care in a family matter: the parent, the community, and the judge. The
standard of care could best be described as: under a given set of circumstances,
what would be a reasonable, prudent person’s actions? The less defined the criteria
for determining reasonable and prudent, the higher the risk that it is left up to the
subjective thoughts of the fact finder.
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family life.
In contrast, when acting in the best interest of the child, the
court must balance the rights of the parents and the rights of the
child. Parents have a constitutional right to due process before the
government may intrude upon their parental rights. 24 It is not a matter
of the degree of governmental intrusion that invokes the
constitutional provisions of due process. Even if the court’s intrusion
is minimal, due process still is unlikely to be waived. 25 If one right
applies, then all rights must apply, including the rights of the
children. In recognizing the rights of the parent, the court should not
overlook the rights of the child. After all, the court is balancing the
rights of the parent with the rights of the child, and where the rights
of the child are in conflict with the rights of the parent, the rights of
the child should prevail.
C. The need for an objective standard
Parents have a constitutional right to raise their child as they
26
see fit. How can this constitutional right of the parent be weighed
against something as elusive as the “best interest” of the child? In
light of the difficulty that comes with addressing this question, “there
is a fear that judges, either intentionally or unintentionally, will apply
their own personal values and preferences to the lives of the families
that come before them . . . .” 27 It has been argued, due to the
vagueness or lack of criteria of the best interest standard, that
decision makers are vulnerable to social biases. 28 In order to balance
the constitutional rights of the parent with the best interest of the
child, the decision should be based on as objective a standard as
24

Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503 n.12 (1977)
(commenting on Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972), noting that the
Court rested its holding in part on the constitutional right of parents to assume the
primary role in decisions concerning the rearing of their children); see also Troxel
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (finding that absent a finding of unfitness,
parents are the primary decision makers in raising their children).
25
See Verheydt v. Verheydt, 295 P.3d 1245, 1251 (Wyo. 2013) (noting that a
waiver of due process “occurs when there is an intentional relinquishment of a
known right manifested in an unequivocal manner”).
26
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69, 71.
27
Wayne, supra note 1, at 41.
28
Id.
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possible, rather than on vague and subjective standards of the fact
finder. 29 Next, it is important to consider how the authority of the
court relates to this fluid definition of “best interest.”
III. Authority of the Court
The authority of the courts comes from the United States
Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789. 30 The U.S. Constitution is
a living, historical document allowing the courts to deal only with the
rights of the people as opposed to imposing the court’s opinion
regarding what is merely good for the people. Dealing with the rights
of the people includes interpreting rights, 31 enforcing rights, 32
defining rights, 33 limiting rights, 34 protecting rights from intrusion,35

29

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1413 (7th ed. 1999) (defining standard as “A model
accepted as correct by custom, consent, or authority”; “A criterion for measuring
acceptability, quality, or accuracy.” Further defining objective standard as “A legal
standard that is based on conduct and perceptions external to a particular person”).
30
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 545 (1840) (answering the question of the
authority of the state in depriving an individual’s personal liberty, Chief Justice
Taney stated, “[W]here is drawn in question, among other subjects, the validity of
an authority exercised under any state, on the ground of such authority being
repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the United States, and the decision of the
state Court is in favour of the validity of such authority”).
31
Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1992-93 (2010) (interpreting the rights of a
custodial parent under the Hague Convention).
32
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 288 (2002) (holding that the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) creates no personal rights to enforce
under Section 1983, barring a former university student’s claims under that
section).
33
McDonald v. City of Chi., Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3020 (2010) (holding that the
Second Amendment right to bear arms is fully applicable to the States by virtue of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
34
Blair v. City of Chi., 201 U.S. 400, 457-58 (1906) (limiting the rights to use the
Chicago streets for street railway purposes based upon the Court’s interpretation of
the actions between the parties).
35
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) (finding that rights and privileges
are secured by the Fourteenth Amendment by way of prohibition against state laws
and proceedings affecting such rights and privileges).
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and giving consequences when rights are violated. 36 Therefore, the
court is required to interpret and define “best interest” of the child as
the rights of the child. When the parental rights come into conflict
with the rights of the child, the court may protect the child’s rights by
limiting the parent’s conduct or enforcing the child’s rights by
removing the child from the parents’ care. But until there is a
balancing of rights between the parents and child, the court should
protect the rights of the parents from governmental intrusion.
A. Constitutional limits on actions by the courts
Today’s court system was authorized such that the judicial
power “shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their authority.” 37 The Judiciary Act of
1789 set up the court structure, with each court’s authority arising
under the Constitution.38 In a speech at Georgetown University on
October 25, 1985, Justice William Brennan Jr. stated, “The
Constitution on its face is, in large measure, a structuring text, a
blueprint for government. And when the text is not prescribing the
form of government it is limiting the powers of that government.” 39
The Constitution limits the authority and power of the executive and
judicial branches of government to interfere into the private life of
the home.
Therefore, the government’s limitation is based upon the
rights of the individuals. 40 The more intrusive government action in
the private life of the family becomes, the greater the need to protect
the individual rights within the family unit and avoid judgments that
36

Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 252 n.1 (1829) (addressing
the question of public use of land and proper compensation regarding rights of
individual property owners).
37
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
38
Matter of Steamboat Josephine, 39 N.Y. 19, 21 (1868).
39
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech at the Text and Teaching Symposium,
Georgetown University, Wash. D.C. (Oct. 12, 1985) [hereinafter Justice Brennan,
Jr., Speech], transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/democracy/sources_document7.html.
40
See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 636-37 (1943) (stating
that government power is limited in favor of individual freedom).
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may temporarily appear to be the “public good.” 41 Life within the
home is in need of the utmost protection due to its private nature.42
The governmental entities that yield power over individuals must
recognize the constitutional limitations to act. “The challenge is
essentially, of course, one to the capacity of our constitutional
structure to foster and protect the freedom, the dignity, and the rights
of all persons within our borders, which it is the great design of the
Constitution to secure.” 43 The court must scrutinize and limit any
governmental action that hinders family interaction. However, when
the court does intervene into the affairs of the family, court
intervention should necessarily protect the rights of the family, which
involves balancing the individual rights of each family member.
B. Balancing the rights of all involved
A judge must carefully balance the rights of all family
members involved and not exercise his or her own authority
according to his or her own morals and values. 44 Justice Brennan
quoted Justice Robert Jackson in stating, “the burden of judicial
interpretation is to translate ‘the majestic generalities of the Bill of
Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the
eighteenth century, into concrete restraints on officials dealing with
the problems of the twentieth century.’” 45 These restraints should be
exercised as courts interpret and protect the rights of the entire
family. However, this “concrete restraint” fell to the wayside as
complicated family issues were presented before the court. Courts
now fashion remedies to everyday issues within the family, claiming
to act in the “best interest” of the child. Yet, because of the court’s
subjective definition of “best interest,” this encroaches the court’s
standards and values on raising a family into someone else’s home.
41

Justice Brennan, Jr., Speech, supra note 39 (“As government acts ever more
deeply upon those areas of our lives once marked ‘private,’ there is an even greater
need to see that individual rights are not curtailed or cheapened in the interest of
what may temporarily appear to be the ‘public good.’”).
42
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 550 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
43
Justice Brennan, Jr., Speech, supra note 39.
44
Wayne, supra note 1, at 41.
45
Justice Brennan, Jr., Speech, supra note 39 (quoting Justice Robert Jackson in
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639).
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In defining “best interest” as the rights of the child, the court must
determine which rights its orders protect, thus restraining the court
from imposing its own version of “good” in the name of “best
interest.”
It has long been recognized that parents have a fundamental
constitutional right to the upbringing of their children. In Pierce v.
Society of the Sisters, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
Fourteenth Amendment provides a liberty interest in a parent’s or
guardian’s right to decide the mode in which his or her children are
educated. 46 The state may not usurp this right when the questioned
legislation does not reasonably relate to a viable state interest. 47 The
Court, in declining to give an exact definition of the liberties
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment in Meyer v. Nebraska,
did recognize that included within the Fourteenth Amendment is the
freedom from governmental interference in the private home,
particular regarding child rearing. 48 This Constitutional protection
can only be guaranteed when protecting and balancing all individual
rights of each family member.
Another example of the protection of the private family unit is
illustrated in the Court’s ruling in Wisconsin v. Yoder. The Supreme
Court held that a Wisconsin law that compelled parents to send their
children to public school until the age of sixteen was unconstitutional
as applied because it impermissibly interfered with the plaintiff’s
Amish religious beliefs. 49 Soon after this decision, the rights afforded
to children began to evolve as courts dealt with family issues. It is in
46

Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 533-34 (1925).
Id. at 534 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and stating that
parents have a liberty interest in the upbringing of children). The Supreme Court
further found that the legislation prohibiting parents from choosing private
education for children unreasonably interfered with liberty of parents to direct
upbringing of children. Id.
48
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 398.
49
See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972) (stating that a
state’s interest in universal education, however highly ranked, is not totally free
from a balancing process when it impinges on other fundamental rights and
interests, such as those protected by the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious
upbringing of their children).
47
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such complex family cases, while balancing individual rights, that
courts need to retain the essence of the Constitution and not impose
their own substantive values over the rights of the individual.
The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, adopted in 1865
and 1868 respectively, were a response to the deprivation of rights by
the states, 50 declaring that no person can be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without the due process of law. 51 The Supreme Court
emphasized, in Parham v. J.R., 52 the necessity of balancing “the
family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children”
and “children hav[ing] a substantial and protectable liberty
interest.” 53 The family and each of its members are constitutionally
protected from governmental intrusion. As a result, “the Court
concluded that parents retain a ‘substantial, if not dominant, role in
the decision . . . absent a finding of neglect or abuse.’” 54
Consequently, courts must carefully weigh the constitutional rights of
the family and not impose their own values and morals onto the
upbringing of the children.
Even the best interest standard, without a balancing of rights,
can be devoid of objective value in visitation disputes as well.55
Without a balancing of rights, there is concern that a judge will
impose his or her subjective values and bias. 56 So, some judges put
50

Several southern states were not willing to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment
abolishing slavery and involuntary servitude. See Gordon Leidner, The Thirteenth
Amendment, GREAT AM. HIST.,
http://www.greatamericanhistory.net/amendment.htm (last visited May 28, 2013).
The Fourteenth Amendment acknowledged a constitutional right and provided, for
those affected, a cause of action against the states that refused to enforce the
Thirteenth Amendment. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
51
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
52
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 631-32 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring).
53
Kristin Henning, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Children at Home: When
Parental Authority Goes Too Far, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 55, 80 (2011).
54
Id.
55
See Alessia Bell, Note, Public and Private Child: Troxel v. Granville and the
Constitutional Rights of Family Members, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 225, 254
(2001) (“In the name of the child’s best interests, courts have denied custody based
on a parent’s sexual orientation, race, financial status, or presumed promiscuity.”).
56
Id.
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forth the mantra of “best interest” as if this lessens the subjectivity of
imposing their own values. All decisions regarding the life of a child
must be in the “best interest” of the child. The judge often begins his
or her ruling with “I find it in the best interest of the child to . . . ”
and then proceeds to announce how the child will be raised. Often, it
is never mentioned how the ruling is in the “best interest” of the
child, thus leaving it up to whatever the judge says it is. Award or
denial of parental visitation often amounts to little more than a good
faith guess based on a judge’s personal experience and preference
about what best serves the child. 57 For example, in Troxel v.
Granville, the trial judge ordered visitation to the child’s
grandparents based on the judge’s own memories of childhood
vacations with his grandparents. 58 In overturning the trial judge’s
decision, however, the Supreme Court nonetheless refused to
question more broadly—beyond an as-applied analysis—the
constitutionality of the best interests standard. 59
Clearly, when a judge imposes his or her own standards and
values in decisions affecting the family, this action invades into
private family life, thus violating the constitutional guarantee against
governmental intrusion. The Fourteenth Amendment cannot be
disregarded or diluted with judicial determination as to the “best
interest” standard. Justice Brennan warned of weakening the
Constitution in this way when he stated: “the Fourteenth Amendment
by a process of absorption . . . has had its source in the belief that
neither liberty nor justice would exist if [those guarantees] . . . were
sacrificed.” 60 Even during the Constitutional Convention, it was
argued that “[t]he Judiciary ought to have an opportunity of
remonstrating [against] projected encroachments on the people as
well as on themselves. It had been said that the Judges, as expositors
57

Id.
Id.
59
Id. (noting that the “Troxel plurality recognized the best interests trap [that the
standard is devoid of objective value in visitation disputes] but failed to escape its
grasp” and go beyond the case before the court in attempting to define ‘best
interest’).
60
Justice Brennan, Jr., Speech, supra note 39 (quoting Justice Cardozo in Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937).
58
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of the Laws would have an opportunity of defending their
constitutional rights.” 61 Without an objective “best interest” standard,
there are no checks and balances on the encroachments into the
family that the executive and judicial branch of government may
conceive.
Therefore, under the U.S. Constitution, it is the role of the
court to limit governmental intrusion into the life of the family.
Interference in family life should only occur if there is a compelling
state interest or to protect the rights of individual family members
against one another. This includes the rights of children. The court
should recognize and balance the rights of each family member
before the court determines the need to interfere into the family.
IV. Rights Encompass All Individuals
While rights have evolved over time, children’s rights have
not always been clearly recognized. For many years, children
constituted “property” under the authority of their fathers, ignoring
any constitutional rights of the mother. 62 This viewpoint eventually
gave way to the “tender years” doctrine, which found that, all things
equal, young children should primarily be in the care and custody of
their mothers. 63 It appears that the effects of the movement to
recognize women’s rights included the area of family law. And
during this time, the courts continued to act with an ambiguous
definition of “best interest of the child”; hence, family issues
continued to come before the court, subject to the standards and
values of the judge.
A. Protecting the rights of the family
The ultimate protection in limiting governmental intrusion
61

James Wilson, Debate from the Constitutional Convention Regarding the
Function of the Judiciary (July 21, 1787), transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/democracy/sources_document5.html.
62
Mercein v. People ex rel. Barry, 25 Wend. 64, 64 (N.Y. 1840); see also Com. v.
Briggs, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 203, 205 (1834) (holding that the father, in general and
by law, is entitled to the custody of his child).
63
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 11 (repealed 1983); see ROBERT G. SPECTOR,
OKLAHOMA FAMILY LAW: THE HANDBOOK 314 (2011-2012 ed. 2011).
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into the family can only be done through the courts of justice. As
stated before, it is the role of the court to protect the constitutional
rights of each family member. “Without this, all the reservations of
particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.”64
Accordingly, the courts are designed to protect the rights of the
people and, when it comes to family law, the rights of the family. As
previously discussed, governmental intrusion is only appropriate to
protect the rights of a family member as balanced against one
another. Based upon the role of the court, the use of the “best
interest” definition must be limited so as not to infringe on the
constitutionally protected rights of all family members.
With this understanding, the Constitution does not allow
judges to impose their own standards and values into the private lives
of families. As Alexander Hamilton, a Founding Father of the United
States, stated, “[t]hey (being judges) ought to regulate their decisions
by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which are not
fundamental.” 65 The court’s role is to protect the personal rights of
individuals guaranteed by the Constitution without imposing personal
judicial standards and values. “The protection of individual rights
through judicial review remains an irreplaceable protection for
individual freedom in the United States.” 66 The safeguarding of
personal rights of the family members is better protected when
determining best interest requires recognizing and balancing the
rights of parents and children.
It has been suggested that the “legislatures and courts have
defined and re-defined the contours of factfinding [sic] and the scope
of judicial authority in child custody litigation by adjusting the
century-old mantra ‘best interest of the child.’” 67 The phrase “best
interest” implicates a range of public policy and personal values
potentially as divergent and numerous as there are judges. 68 But best
for whom? If it is best for the child, why and how so? If it is best for
64

THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
Id.
66
RALPH C. CHANDLER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DESKBOOK: INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS 8 (2d ed. 1993).
67
Prescott, supra note 2, at 110.
68
Id. at 110.
65
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the family, it seems this would necessitate defining the why and how
for each family member. This implies, in and of itself, a balancing of
interest between all family members. Whose standard shall apply to
raising a child? If the best interest standard is left to the court’s
discretion, how does this allow for a “judicial [system] that is
predictable, determinate, and knowledge-based”? 69
B. Protecting children under the Parens Patriae doctrine
To provide some guidance for determining the best interest of
the child, the government’s role has been labeled parens patriae. 70
The parens patriae doctrine grants the state with inherent power and
authority to protect persons who are legally unable to act on their
own behalf, such as children. 71 The law presumes that parents act in
the best interest of their children. 72 However, when the state believes
that parents are not acting in the best interest of the child, the state
may intercede on behalf of the child under the parens patriae
doctrine. Thus, the doctrine creates a state actor who imposes its own
morals and viewpoints upon parents who have the right to raise their
children as they see fit. The Constitution limits these intrusions into
69

Id. at 119.
Mahmoodjanloo v. Mahmoodjanloo, 160 P.3d 951, 956 (Okla. 2007) (Kauger, J.,
concurring) (acknowledging that the State of Oklahoma has a right in the role of
parens patriae to preserve and promote the welfare of children).
71
Sauro v. Sauro, 42 A.3d 227, 237-38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012) (noting
that the parens patriae doctrine authorizes the Family Court to modify freely
negotiated arbitration clauses concerning child custody and parenting time, by
imposing judicial oversight to prevent an adverse impact or harm to the child); see
also Sizemore v. Pickett, 76 So. 3d 788, 795 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (raising issues
pertaining to the child’s welfare and parental fitness and finding that the court
possesses a duty to determine the best interest as parens patriae).
72
In re Bordalo, 55 A.3d 982, 984 (N.H. 2012) (recognizing the parents’
fundamental liberty interest in raising their children and this does not go away
simply because the parents have not been model parents); see also Norrod v.
Norrod, 165 P.3d 366, 370 (Okla. Civ. App. 2007) (holding that to obtain custody
in a divorce proceeding over the objection of a parent, a grandparent must show the
parent’s unfitness by evidence that is clear and conclusive, and makes the necessity
for doing so appear imperative; the unfitness may not be demonstrated by a mere
comparison between what is offered by the competing parties, but only by a
showing that the parent cannot reasonably be expected to provide for the child’s
ordinary comfort or intellectual and moral development).
70
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the family. Judicial oversight is required for the government to
infringe upon the family’s rights. Without a judicial determination of
neglect or abuse, there is no legal basis for intruding into the family.
Parens patriae in America came from the British rule that
granted the royal prerogative of the King to act in his capacity as
parens patriae, or universal trustee. 73 In McIntosh v. Dill, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that “well-organized and civilized
government requires the power to control the persons and property of
. . . infants, lunatics, and those held incompetent,” under parens
patriae. 74 Parens patriae is meant to promote action in the best
interest of the child. 75 Judge Cardozo described the doctrine in Finlay
v. Finlay as the judge putting:
[H]imself in the position of a ‘wise, affectionate and
careful parent’ and mak[ing] provision for the child
accordingly. . . . He ‘interferes for the protection of
infants, . . . by virtue of the prerogative which
belongs to the [state] as parens patriae.’ The
‘paramount consideration for the court at the time of
divorce, or at the time of a requested alteration of a
decree regarding custody, is the present and future
welfare and well-being of the child.’ 76
73

Dollar Sav. Bank v. United States, 86 U.S. 227, 239 (1873); see also United
States v. Wittek, 337 U.S. 346, 359 n.16 (1949) (“The most general words that can
be devised (for example, any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate) affect
not him (the King of England) in the least, if they may tend to restrain or diminish
any of his rights and interests. The rule thus settled respecting the British Crown is
equally applicable to this government, and it has been applied frequently in the
different States, and practically in the Federal courts.”).
74
Jones v. Jones, 680 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the state
should not interfere with parental rights to their children unless there is a failure to
discharge the parental duty); McIntosh v. Dill, 205 P. 917, 917 (Okla. 1922); see
also In re G.W., 977 N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that the state has
a compelling interest in protecting children and the authority to intervene when
parents abuse, neglect, or abandon their children (citing G.B. v. Dearborn Cnty.
Div. of Family & Children, 754 N.E.2d 1027, 1032 (Ind. Ct. App 2001) trans.
denied (2002)).
75
Prescott, supra note 2, at 123.
76
Id. at 122 (internal quotations omitted).
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But parens patriae does not supersede the Constitution,77
consequently bringing into question the standard used in making
provisions for a child. Under the Constitution, does a judge have the
authority to place him or herself in an “affectionate and careful”
position when dealing with children? The courts are concerned
“about diminished capacity of youth,” and “the Court has
consistently recognized the State’s need to adjust its legal system to
account for the unique role of the family and the vulnerability and
special needs of the minor.” 78 But this adjustment of the legal system
has led the courts to do what is good for the child, not what is in the
“best interest” of the child. What is good for the child is much more
expansive and subjective than what are the rights of the child as in
“best interest.”
Judges should consider the fundamental constitutional rights
of all family members rather than simply applying their own
judgment over that of the parents. The Constitution provides a very
narrow scope for allowing intervention into the family. The judge’s
authority to act in the best interest of the child is based upon evidence
of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. When court intervention is
necessary, it demands the balancing of the rights of the parent with
those of the child. The court must respect the parental standard of
care for the child unless the parents’ conduct rises to the level of
abuse or neglect, affecting the child’s health, welfare, safety, or
creating a risk of imminent harm.
V. Rights of the Child
Parents are not the only persons who have rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment; children do as well. Since In re Gault, the
court system has begun recognizing children as having constitutional
77

In re G.W., 977 N.E.2d at 384-85 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects a parent’s fundamental right to raise a child, but that said right was not
unlimited; the state has a compelling interest in protecting the welfare of children
and, where there is neglect, abuse, or abandonment of the children, the state has
authority under parens patriae to intervene).
78
Henning, supra note 53, at 83.
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rights. 79 Because children are recognized as having constitutional
rights, state intrusion into the family requires the child’s rights to be
recognized in the balancing of all family members’ rights before state
action can begin. In re Gault, a landmark U.S. Supreme Court
decision, held that juveniles accused of crimes in a delinquency
proceeding must be afforded the same due process rights as adults,
such as the right to timely notification of the charges, the right to
confront witnesses, the right against self-incrimination, and the right
to counsel. 80 In re Gault recognized children’s rights for the first
time, noting that the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights
did not apply exclusively to adults. 81 However, in establishing that
children were guaranteed rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Gault Court noted:
The Court’s concerns for the vulnerability of children
is demonstrated in its decisions dealing with minors’
claims to constitutional protection against deprivations
of liberty or property interests by the State. With
respect to many of these claims, we have concluded
that the child’s right is virtually coextensive with that
of an adult. 82
In other words, the Court recognized that children have rights to be
protected, but left the questions as to how the child’s rights stood
against those of the parents, and when a child should be allowed to
exercise these rights. The Court answered these questions in a
subsequent case, Bellotti v. Baird.
In Bellotti v. Baird, the Supreme Court continued to recognize
a child’s rights as being protected by the same constitutional
guarantees as adults, but allowed the state to take into account
“children’s vulnerability and their needs for ‘concern, . . . sympathy,
79

Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 230 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (recognizing that all children everywhere in the nation are protected by
the Constitution and could seek redress from the courts if those constitutional rights
were violated).
80
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
81
Henning, supra note 53, at 62 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13).
82
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
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and . . . paternal attention.’” 83 The state could account for these
concerns by adjusting its legal system, due to the fact that children
“lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and
avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.” 84 As only the
child’s vulnerability may be taken into account, it follows that the
state’s adjustment of its legal system does not include disregarding
the parental rights to the upbringing of their children. Short of abuse
or neglect, parents continue to have a constitutional right in raising
their children based upon the parents’ standards and values, not the
state’s standards and values. 85 The Supreme Court in Bellotti, for
example, recognized the crucial right of parents to control the
nurturing and direction of their child’s destiny. 86 It was viewed as the
role and obligation of the parents to instill moral standards and
religious beliefs as they prepared their child for active citizenship.
The Constitution protects the rights of parents to exercise
their standard for raising a child against governmental intrusion,
except for abuse or neglect that affects the child’s health, welfare, or
safety. 87 The court should not override the parents’ standard of care
with its own. 88 When a court does not distinguish between what is
best for the child and what is in the best interest of the child, the court
therefore begins to delve into childrearing, which is prohibited by the
Constitution. The Supreme Court in Bellotti recognized the
constitutional rights of parents to determine the upbringing of their
children without interference by acknowledging liberty and freedom
83

Id. at 635 (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971)).
Id.
85
See In re G.W., 977 N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that the state
has a compelling interest in protecting children and the authority to intervene when
parents abuse, neglect, or abandon their children).
86
Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637-38.
87
See supra Part III.
88
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 623-25 (1979) (Stewart, J., concurring) (discussing
the rebuttable presumption that parents act in the best interest of their children,
recognizing a child’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, noting the balancing
of the parents’ and child’s rights, and the state’s authority for intervention only in
the event of abuse or neglect); see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000)
(ruling in favor of the grandparents based upon the judge’s own relationship with
his grandparents growing up).
84
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of choice in raising a child based upon the parents’ “ethical,
religious,” and “political beliefs” that “the state can neither supply
nor hinder.” 89
Given this information, how is the court to recognize,
interpret, and protect the rights of the child? As the Court in Bellotti
stated, “if the child shows that she is ‘mature enough and well
enough informed’ to understand the procedure and to make an
intelligent assessment of her circumstances, she is entitled to exercise
her right . . . without interference by her parents.” 90 This reasoning
underscores the fact that the law does not change, but the child’s
understanding and maturity transforms, entitling him or her to more
fully exercise his or her rights. The lady holding the scales of justice
is blindfolded for a reason. The law is applied to all equally; race,
religion, gender, and age are not contributing factors. The facts
change from one case to the next, but the application of the law to
those facts should not change.
As noted in Bellotti, it is the child’s ability to understand and
make an intelligent assessment of his or her rights that determines his
or her ability to exercise those rights, though balanced against the
parents’ right in raising their child. 91 And it is the Constitution that
protects the private lives of families from court intrusion. 92
Accordingly, “the entry . . . into a home, for whatever purpose,
represents the greatest governmental intrusion into an individual’s
privacy.” 93 Most often, these types of intrusions dictate and affect the
parents’ standard of care. 94 But this “standard of care” is
constitutionally protected from governmental intrusion within the

89

See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 638 (describing the state’s dedication to individual
freedom and freedom of choice as the basis for refraining from dictating the way
parents should raise their children).
90
Id. at 643.
91
Id. at 633-34.
92
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-66.
93
Henning, supra note 53, at 89. This entry into the home may include, for
example, state intervention, a parenting coordinator’s decision, or a court order
limiting or denying parent conduct. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68.
94
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69.
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home, with an exception for abuse and neglect. 95 A parent’s right to
raise his or her child according to his or her standard of care must be
recognized when interpreting the “best interest of the child.” 96
Over time, the courts have recognized the constitutionally
protected interest in parents’ rights to raise their children as they
deem appropriate, with minimal government interference. 97 This is as
fundamental as the parents’ right to establish their home, which
includes the raising of their children. 98 After all, the courts begin with
the presumption that parents act in the child’s best interest. Due
process requires the balancing of the rights of parents and children
before the government may interfere in the family. Due process also
protects the constitutional rights of the individual family members
through the presumption that parents act in the best interest of their
children. 99 This governmental interference includes the court’s
decisions regarding the choice of educational needs, religion, medical
care, discipline, recreational activities, and so forth. 100 If the courts
are going to recognize, and hold accountable to some limited degree,
the parents’ responsibility to raise their children, then parents “are
95

Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 429 (5th
Cir. 2008).
96
Id.
97
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 79 (Souter, J., concurring).
98
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
99
Henning, supra note 53, at 74; see also Donald C. Hubin, Parental Rights and
Due Process, 1 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 123, 132 (1999) (stating that the rights of the
parents to raise their children is fundamental and protected by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, that due process protections are invoked when
governmental action threatens parents’ rights to the custody of their children, and
that parents may not be deprived of the right to raise their children absent a strong
governmental interest); see also US Supreme Court Upholds Parental Rights in
Troxel v. Granville—June 2000, FAM. CT. VALUES BLOG (Apr. 12, 2009, 1:31
PM), http://familycourtvalues.blogspot.com/2009/04/us-supreme-court-upholdsparental.html (noting that without a finding of parental unfitness, courts infringe
upon parental rights if they make decisions contrary to parental determinations of
what is in their child’s “best interest”); Who Really Guards the Bill of Rights? Its
Not Conservatives, FAM. CT. VALUES BLOG (Apr. 8, 2009, 7:51 AM),
http://familycourtvalues.blogspot.com/2009/04/who-really-guards-bill-of-rightsits.html.
100
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
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entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that
responsibility.” 101 There are legal restrictions placed on children in
recognition of parental roles that are vital to the child’s opportunity
for growth and maturity, and which uphold our free society. 102 “Thus,
both legislative and judicial deference to parental control and
instruction prepares children to live independently and advances
individual freedoms and liberty in society.” 103 Governmental
interference within the home requires a compelling state interest. 104
A decision involving the home affects all family members. 105 The
Constitution applies equally to both parent and child and “the court
should balance those rights.” 106
VI. Parental Rights Versus Children’s Best Interest
Once it is established that all family members have
constitutional rights, the task in defining and protecting those same
rights results from balancing them. This requires three
considerations: these rights are equal; the child’s rights may be
treated as unequal, balanced against the rights of the parents; and the
state, in balancing the child’s rights, can limit the parents’ rights. 107
A. Equal consideration
The fact that they are children does not support the idea that
their rights are inferior to the rights of their parents. 108 “Although it is
virtually undisputed that children have some Fourth Amendment
rights independent of their parents, it is equally clear that [in some
101

Henning, supra note 53, at 75.
Id.
103
Id.
104
Croft v. Westmoreland Cnty. Child. & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d
Cir. 1997).
105
See, e.g., CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD 4-5 (2012),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/best_interest.pdf
(noting the importance of maintaining sibling and other close family bonds when
children are removed from their homes).
106
Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1019 (7th Cir. 2000).
107
Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 3.
108
Id.
102
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circumstances youth will receive] less constitutional protection than
adults.” 109 When determining constitutional rights, it has been argued
that children should have equal consideration. 110 The difference is, as
in Bellotti, the child’s ability to fulfill their role in appreciating and
applying those rights. 111 This equal consideration theory is based
upon a common sense approach of three equal theses: Equal
Consideration Thesis, Unequal Consideration Thesis, and Limited
Parental Rights Thesis. 112 It has been further argued that equal
consideration should be given to everyone due to his or her moral
status. 113 The equal consideration theory should be applied to the
rights of individuals. Children are entitled to moral consideration
simply because they are persons. 114 The Constitution, under this same
premise, protects rights of all individuals without exception.115
Because children are persons, they are entitled to the same
constitutional protections as any adult. 116 In order to deny this
assertion, one would need to argue either that individuals do not
derive their rights from their status as persons, or that children are not
individuals. 117
Therefore, by virtue of “being,” the same rights protected for
109

Henning, supra note 53, at 59.
Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 2.
111
Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634.
112
Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 3 (offering a rights-based theory of the
moral status of children that the authors claim both meets the constraints that define
the commonsense position and resolves the internal conflicts the three theses may
propose). By “distinguishing basic rights to which all persons are entitled from
constructed rights that depend on factors besides one’s status as a person, and by
thinking of parental rights as stewardship rights and thus as right with thresholds,
we can reconcile the three claims that make up the commonsense position with
regards to the moral status of children.” Id. at 13.
113
Id. at 2.
114
Id.
115
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . .
.”) (emphasis added).
116
Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 3.
117
Id.
110
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adults also belong to children. 118 Those rights “include the rights to
life, liberty, property, and freedom from deliberate harm.” 119 But
when do rights become protected by the Constitution and enforceable
through the courts? As far as the right to life, it attaches to the child
at a certain term in utero. 120 The right to liberty is up for debate since
Roe v. Wade 121 as to when the court can take action, balancing the
rights of the woman and a viable unborn child. One of the challenges
is seen in Bellotti with the exercise of a minor’s right to obtain an
abortion without parental consent. 122 In another instance, regarding
the right to property, it is a matter of determining age and maturity in
order for the child to act based upon his or her own best interest. 123
The right to freedom from deliberate harm attaches immediately at
birth and is enforceable by the courts without question. 124
It is not when the rights attach to the child that matters; it is
when these rights can be exercised by the child and balanced within
the framework of the parental rights and best interest of the child.125
According to the Bellotti court, a child may exercise his or her rights
independently of his or her parents when the child understands,

118

Id.
Id. at 6.
120
As the Court struggles with the issue of abortion, they have found that states
have an interest in the unborn child at the point of being viable. The state argues it
has an interest over the privacy rights of the mother to regulate in a limited manner
the issue of abortion on behalf of the fetus. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs.,
492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989).
121
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
122
Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 640-41.
123
Pavlides v. Niles Gun Show, Inc., 637 N.E.2d 404, 409 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994)
(stating minors are prohibited from purchasing guns or ammunition); see Berg v.
Traylor, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 140, 146-47 (Ct. App. 2007) (placing a limitation on
minors signing contracts); see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525,
588-89 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that every state prohibits the sale
of alcohol to those under age twenty-one).
124
R.W.D. v. Walker Cnty. Dep’t of Human Res., 808 So. 2d 46, 48 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2001) (removing a child that tested positive for cocaine at birth from the care
of the parents); see also In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1005 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008)
(involuntarily terminating the parental rights of a mother who was incarcerated).
125
Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635.
119
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appreciates, and can intelligently exercise those rights. 126 But until
that time, the parents are responsible for preparing their child for
adulthood. 127 The responsibility of that parent is to raise a child with
the values and morals that align with the family, whether or not the
court agrees with those values and morals. 128 This responsibility falls
on the parent, until such time that the child can either intelligently
exercise his or her broad constitutional right, as well as statutorily
acknowledged rights, such as driving a car, voting, or purchasing
firearms. Such statutory rights may be curtailed in ways that
otherwise could not constitutionally be limited in the case of an
adult. 129
The right to abortion is another example of a right that
depends on the maturity of the child who is exercising the right.
Before a child may obtain an abortion without parental consent, she
must demonstrate the ability to intelligently and knowingly exercise
that right. For some rights, however, the court has upheld that the
only requirement for this determination is the age of the child. An
eighteen-year-old does not need to demonstrate that he or she can
intelligently vote for a candidate, as age is the only legal requirement.
But before the child may exercise his or her right, the child may be
treated differently than adults. Until the child can demonstrate the
above criteria, there is the unequal treatment of the child in
exercising the constitutional right to privacy. 130 Requiring the legal
process for a minor to petition the court for an abortion without
parental consent allows the rights of the child to be recognized as
equal, but subject to the parents’ oversight and standards. When a
judge determines a child has met her burden of proof to obtain an
abortion without parental consent, that child has equally recognizable
rights as the parental rights. But without a court order, the exercise of
126

After taking testimony from the juvenile, a judge must determine whether or not
the juvenile has demonstrated the necessary criteria based upon Bellotti and the
statutes to grant her request to have an abortion without parental consent. Id. at
633-34.
127
Id.
128
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923).
129
Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634.
130
Id.
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the child’s rights can be limited. This is the unequal treatment of the
child’s rights, which leads to the next proposition.
B. Unequal thesis: parental authority over their children’s
rights
There are certain activities adults may freely participate in that
would neither be in the child’s “best interest,” nor appropriate for
someone under the age of eighteen. While it would be
unconstitutional to prohibit an adult from participating in these
activities, children can be prohibited from participating in them by
the executive and judicial branches of government.
The Unequal Treatment Thesis: Children – at least at
certain ages – can be legitimately prevented from
doing certain things that it would be illegitimate to
prevent adults from doing. Most of us accept this
thesis. Well-known and plausible examples of things
we allow adults but not children to do are voting,
driving cars, owning firearms, signing contracts, and
drinking alcohol. 131
Even though children may have rights, the ability to exercise
those rights is legitimately prevented until either of two occurrences.
As in Bellotti, the child must first be able to demonstrate that he or
she is mature enough to exercise those rights; 132 and second, the child
must be able to exercise those rights upon reaching the appropriate
age. The legislature has limited the exercise of certain rights until
reaching what has been deemed a permissible age, for example, to
vote or enter into a contract. 133 It is permissible to limit a person’s
right to enter into a binding contract until he or she reaches the age of
eighteen. If a child is emancipated before the age of eighteen,
however, a court has determined that the child has demonstrated the
maturity to exercise the right to contract. “A person can have a role131

Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 3.
Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633-34.
133
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-101 (West 2013) (stating that eighteen is age of majority,
except that persons sixteen or over who are or have been married are considered to
be of age for all matters relating to contract, property rights, liabilities, and capacity
to sue and be sued); Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 7.
132
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dependent right only if she can fill the role in question. When rights
depend on roles, if you can’t play the role, then you don’t get the
right.” 134 Legislation has declared children incapable of exercising
certain rights, presumably because children do not have the requisite
level of intellect necessary to make rational decisions in exercising
those rights. 135 As long as the parents act in the best interest of their
children, parents have “stewardship rights.” 136 It is suggested that
‘parent-as-steward’ carries with it duties toward the child. Those
duties include “not violating the rights of the child,” not allowing
others to do so, and promoting “the interest of the child.” 137
This presumption of parental duty over the exercise of the
child’s rights is not the same as balancing the rights of the parent and
the rights of the child. 138 This difference is considered under the
Limited Parental Rights Thesis in which “[p]arents can legitimately
exercise limited but significant discretion in raising children.” 139 The
Constitution and various statutes 140 acknowledge the parent’s
responsibility and the right of the child to be raised in a mentally,
physically, and emotionally healthy atmosphere. 141 This is the start of
134

Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 7. An example would be when a child
petitions the court for emancipation. A finding of emancipation allows the minor to
become “role-dependent” in ability to contract. Id.
135
For example, anyone under the age of eighteen cannot marry without parental
consent, or get a tattoo, and under most circumstances, those who enter into
contract with a minor may not be able to enforce it against said minor due to age.
See, e.g., Daubert v. Mosley, 487 P.2d 353, 357 (Okla. 1971) (finding that an
emancipated minor by way of marriage could not disavow the contract due to his
age).
136
Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 11.
137
Id. at 12.
138
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 624 (1979) (Stewart, J., concurring).
139
Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 4.
140
E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-1-102 (West 2013) (stating that parents
have a natural, legal, and moral right, as well as a duty, to care for and support their
children and such rights are protected by state and federal laws as well as the
Constitution). In practice, where family circumstances threaten the safety of a
child, the state’s interest in the welfare of the child takes precedence over the
natural rights and authority of the parent to the extent that it is necessary to protect
the child and assure that the best interests of the child are met.
141
Parham, 442 U.S. at 604.
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the slippery slope where courts begin to use the phrase “best interest”
when in fact the court is dealing with what it believes is good for the
child. 142 As previously observed, when courts deal with what is good
for a child, the court usually thrusts its subjective values and
standards into the privacy of the home. 143
As a hypothetical example, no court would personally
approve of a parent raising their child to adopt the radical religious
views of a white supremacy group. Could it be argued that being
brought up with these views can be emotionally and mentally
harmful? Such an argument has been made, 144 but constitutionally,
the standard should be based upon the parents’ standard and not that
of the court, short of abuse or neglect. 145
It is the opinion of this author that, absent evidence of mental
or emotional abuse, the issue is whether the parents have a right to
raise their child in this manner. Even though this author would not
wish to see such a radical view imposed upon a child, its harm cannot
be measured in such a way as to intrude upon the parents’ rights in
raising their child. This would be tantamount to forbidding a parent
to such a practice and would be based upon a value standard. If there
was a measure of significant harm to the child, this could be a basis
for removing the child from the home. Yet child welfare has not
removed children based upon these circumstances. When considering
the best interest of the child, there needs to be a finding that the
parents’ behavior is detrimental to the child physically, emotionally,
or mentally before the court should act. 146 When there is such a
142

Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634.
Id.
144
Jarrell v. Jarrell, No. W2011–00578–COA–R3–CV, 2012 WL 1066398, at *3
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2012) (holding that courts must maintain strict neutrality
involving religious disputes between divorced parents unless it threatens the health
and well-being of the child); see also Harrison v. Tauheed, 256 P.3d 851, 864
(Kan. 2011) (differentiating between a parent’s religious beliefs and religiously
motivated actions or conduct that affects the best interest of the child).
145
Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 429 (5th
Cir. 2008).
146
Ervin R. v. Phina R., 717 N.Y.S.2d 849, 856-57 (Fam. Ct. 2000). Here the court
found that both parents’ hostility toward each other was not due to religious beliefs
or practices, but rather were the parties using their religion to interfere with the
143
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finding, the government, acting through the court system, has a duty
to intercede on behalf of the child. 147 The courts have had a tendency
to impose their morals and values into homes where the parents lack
education and scarce means of support and to inform these parents
that they are inadequate based upon the best interest of the child
standard. 148 The parents have the right and “the responsibility to
nurture and protect the child, and the authority to exercise [their] own
judgment in doing so on a day-to-day basis.” 149 Parents have been
assigned the right to raise their children, protected from
governmental intrusion—except for instances of abuse and neglect—
in such a way as deemed proper according to the parents’ standard of
care—not the standard of care of the court. 150 The right of parents to
raise their children free from governmental intrusion 151 creates a
rebuttable presumption that parents act in the best interest of their
child. In order for the government to rebut this presumption, the
balancing of individual rights must occur. The evidence must be
sufficient before the government may intervene. In balancing the
rights of the parents and the child, where there is a conflict, the

relationship between the child and the non-custodial parent. Id. The court ruled the
custodial parent determines the appropriate level of religious beliefs and the parent
receiving visitation must honor it. Id. See also Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 432
N.E.2d 765, 767 (N.Y. 1982) (finding a mother to be less fit and changing primary
custody where the original decree stated the children would be brought up in the
parents’ faith because the mother’s conduct was found to be “flagrantly violating
those tenets which ‘confused the children and was contrary to their religious beliefs
and detrimental to their religious feeling’”).
147
See Gates, 537 F.3d at 429.
148
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 78-79 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that parents should be
“free of judicially compelled visitation” because “a judge believed he ‘could make
a better decision’ than the objecting parent had done”); Wayne, supra note 1, at 41
(arguing that without an articulated standard, the fear is that judges “apply their
own personal values and preferences”); see also Bell, supra note 43, at 254
(arguing that without an “objective value,” findings amount to a “good faith guess”
and are based upon a judge’s personal experiences).
149
Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 4.
150
See Gates, 537 F.3d at 429.
151
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
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child’s rights prevail. 152 This leads to the third and final thesis.
C. Third thesis: best interest of the child may outweigh
parental rights
The third thesis is the “Limited Parental Rights Thesis” and
is described as parental rights with thresholds. 153 Under this thesis,
parental rights may be infringed upon under two conditions: first,
when there is a conflict between the best interest (i.e., rights) of the
child and the rights of the parent; and second, if doing so will bring
about a large enough benefit to the child. 154
As applied to parental rights versus children’s rights, usually
both of the above overriding conditions are present. When a child is
initially removed from the home in a juvenile case, the executive
branch of the government—the Department of Human Services or
the District Attorney’s office—must prove to the court that there is a
reasonable suspicion that the child’s health, welfare, or safety may be
in imminent danger. 155 An example would be the use of corporal
punishment. It is a general consensus among judges that if the
corporal punishment rises to the level of leaving bruises or
lacerations, then the child’s right outweighs the right of the parents to
discipline their child because of the abuse and neglect exception to
parental rights. 156 Unless the use of corporal punishment raises a
152

Matter of Welfare of Tarango, 595 P.2d 552, 555 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979)
(holding that when the rights of the parent and the welfare of the child are in
conflict, the welfare of the child must prevail); see also S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v.
Roe, 639 S.E.2d 165, 168 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the interest of the
child shall prevail if the child’s interest and the parental rights conflict).
153
Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 8.
154
Id. at 8-9. This condition is met when the child’s needs are not being met, which
leads to or potentially could lead to imminent harm or danger to the child. “So long
as the child is not being harmed, parental rights are generally not to be infringed
merely to provide some marginal benefit for the child.” Id.
155
See, e.g., Arce v. Cnty. of L.A., 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 735, 746 (Ct. App. 2012);
Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 244 P.3d 247, 250 (Idaho Ct. App. 2010);
N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.D., 23 A.3d 352, 354 (N.J. 2011).
156
Judges may not believe in corporal punishment. Some may not have raised their
children with the use of corporal punishment. This is a valid value judgment on
behalf of any parent. However, to date this author is unaware of any statutes or
court findings where the use of corporal punishment alone rises to the level of state
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reasonable suspicion that the child’s health, welfare, or safety would
be at issue, the parents have a right to discipline their child, which
overrides any child’s right in this situation.157 The parents have the
right to discipline their child—as long as it does not rise to level of
physical or mental abuse—because this brings about a greater benefit
to society and also outweighs any rights the child may have, if any, to
being punished as the parents see fit. “Thus for the parent who
respects the spirit of the basic rights of the child, and who is willing
to infringe them only when necessary and only to the degree
necessary, the rights of the child will generally not interfere with the
effective nurturing of the child.” 158 This illustration demonstrates the
difference between a parent spanking the child in a disciplinary way
versus just walking up and slapping the child upside the head because
the parent is angry. “[T]he fact that parents do have rights [suggests]
that so long as the child is not being harmed, parental rights are
generally not to be infringed merely to provide some marginal benefit
for the child.” 159 “Discipline literally means training that is expected
to produce a specific character or pattern of behavior” 160
The right of parents to raise their child as they see fit becomes
more complicated when the court is dealing with separated parents
who choose to raise their child differently, such as in the case of
intervention in child abuse cases. However, a judge who handles divorce and
paternity cases is more likely to intervene based upon his or her valued belief.
157
G.C. v. R.S., 71 So. 3d 164, 166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (reversing a finding
of domestic violence when the father used corporal punishment in non-excessive
manner and recognizing “a parent’s right to administer reasonable and nonexcessive corporal punishment to discipline their children”); see also Hamilton ex
rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 270 P.3d 1024, 1031 (Haw. 2012) (reversing a lower court
decision and stating that “parents have a fundamental right to discipline their child
under the United States and Hawaii Constitutions that includes a right to employ
corporal punishment”); cf. Griffith v. Latiolais, 70 So. 3d 71, 79-80 (La. Ct. App.
2011) (granting joint custody and an order prohibiting corporal punishment by
either parent).
158
Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 17.
159
Id. at 9.
160
William Carmichael, SEVEN HABITS OF A HEALTHY HOME: PREPARING THE
GROUND IN WHICH YOUR CHILDREN CAN GROW 92 (Lynn Vanderzalm ed., 1997).
“[G]ood discipline is applied as an external boundary. The goal is to keep external
boundaries in place until children develop their own external boundaries.” Id. at 95.
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divorce or paternity actions. Both parents have an equal
constitutional right to raise their child when in their home.161
However, when a parent has sole legal custody, these rights change if
they pertain to certain major decisions related to raising a child.162
The court may only interfere if the action rises to the level of
significant harm to the child’s rights or upon a showing of a change
of circumstances sufficient to warrant custody modification. 163
Courts start with the presumption that parents will act in the
best interest of their children. “This stewardship conception of
parental rights allows us to posit parental rights – and thus keep the
state from meddling too much in family affairs – without treating the
child as property of the parent.” 164 And who better to exercise this
stewardship than the child’s parents? In doing so, parents are
161

In re Adoption of Ta’Niya C., 8 A.3d 745, 754 n.13 (Md. 2010) (noting that
when it comes to “custody (and visitation) disputes,” neither parent “has any
preference over the other” and making a distinction between a parent and a third
party, stating “there is a legal preference” and that “we have recognized that
parents have a fundamental, Constitutionally-based right to raise their children free
from undue and unwarranted interference on the part of the State, including its
courts”); McDermott v. Dougherty, 869 A.2d 751, 770 (Md. 2005) (“In a situation
in which both parents seek custody, each parent proceeds in possession . . . of a
constitutionally-protected fundamental parental right. Neither parent has a superior
claim to the exercise of this right to provide ‘care, custody, and control’ of the
children. Effectively, then, each fit parent’s constitutional right neutralizes the
other parent’s constitutional right . . . .”); see also Rico v. Rodriguez, 120 P.3d 812,
817 (Nev. 2005) (“In a custody dispute between two fit parents, the fundamental
constitutional right to the care and custody of the children is equal.”).
162
A.G.R. ex rel. Conflenti v. Huff, 815 N.E.2d 120, 125 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)
(finding the custodial parent enjoys the right to determine the religious training of
the child as long as the custodial parent does not use it as a means to interfere with
the noncustodial parent’s parenting time and there is no showing of substantial
harm affecting the child’s physical health or emotional development); see also
Hamilton, 270 P.3d at 1027 (holding that the non-custodial parent retains the right
to discipline his child for conduct that occurs while under the supervision of the
non-custodial parent); Baldwin v. Baldwin, 710 A.2d 610, 616 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1998) (Brosky, J., dissenting) (stating that the non-custodial parent has an interest
in sharing in the rearing and love of the child).
163
See, e.g., Fridley v. Fridley, 748 N.E.2d 939, 941 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Shade v.
Wright, 805 N.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010).
164
Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 13.

262

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/clrj/vol33/iss2/3

34

Funderburk: Best Interest of the Child Should Not Be an Ambiguous Term

Children’s Legal Rights Journal

Volume 33, Fall 2013

Best Interest of the Child Should Not Be an Ambiguous Term
presumed to be looking not only to the present health and welfare of
the child, but also to maximize the future health and welfare of the
child. 165
When courts begin weighing parents’ rights versus children’s
rights, “it requires that judges have a standard of well-being by which
to assess children’s interests. As a policy, the best interest guides
judges by requiring that they decide what is in the children’s best
interest, but it leaves open to interpretation what is in a child’s
interest.” 166 The standard of well-being courts should use to assess a
child’s interest should be that of the parents if there is no evidence of
harm to the child’s health, welfare, or safety that rises to the level of
abuse or neglect. Parents’ rights to decide without interference are
still subject to some limits, though, and must be balanced against the
constitutional rights and well-being of the child. 167 The presumption
that parents act in the best interest of their children 168 may be
overcome by evidence of harm to the children, the risk of error in the
parents’ judgment, or conflicts in the home that likely undermine the
ability of parents to act in their children’s best interest. 169
When dealing with the family, the court should recognize the
rights of each family member and how the relief requested affects
each right. Next, the court should balance each of those rights and
where the parents’ rights are in conflict with the rights of the child
(i.e., best interest), the child’s rights should prevail. 170
VII. Limiting Parental Authority Over the Rights of the Child

165

Id. at 18.
Id.
167
Doan-Uyen Thi Le v. Thang Q. Nguyen, 241 P.3d 647, 652 (Okla. Civ. App.
2010) (“[U]ltimately, custodial decisions, even those involving termination of joint
custody, are dependent upon the best interests of the child.”); see also In re
Paternity of C.A.S., 468 N.W.2d 719, 727 (Wis. 1991) (“The best interests of the
children are the ultimate and paramount considerations.”).
168
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 71.
169
Henning, supra note 53, at 79.
170
Doan-Uyen Thi Le, 241 P.3d at 652.
166
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Recently, the Supreme Court has begun to limit the parental
authority over the rights of the child. This can be seen in the abortion
context. 171 “The Court was more willing to impose more
comprehensive judicial procedures to protect the fundamental rights
of minors.” 172 Once the child could express an intelligent and mature
basis for wanting to exercise her rights apart from her parents, the
court has allowed the child to exercise her individual Fourteenth
Amendment rights. 173 “[T]he Court concluded in Bellotti v. Baird
that society’s interest in safeguarding parental authority and
preserving family unity was outweighed by the rights of mature
minors to obtain an abortion without their parents’ consent.” 174 Some
determinations deeming children mature enough and capable of
exercising their rights intelligently are defined in statutes based on
age, such as when they may drive a vehicle, vote in federal and state
elections, or drink alcoholic beverages. To deny the exercise of these
rights to an adult would not be permissible. “In mediating conflict
between the rights and interests of children and their parents, the
Court has often imposed procedural safeguards that vary with the
nature of the interest at stake and has recognized the maturity of
some minors to make their own decisions and protect their own
interests.” 175
However, in protecting the integrity of the family, the courts
must balance the rights of the entire family. 176 “The state must guard
not only [children’s] current liberty, but also their future liberty. It
must deny all others, including parents, the right to deprive the young
either of their basic liberty during their immaturity, or their ability to

171

Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633-34.
Henning, supra note 53, at 81.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 82.
176
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-1-102 (West 2013). The Oklahoma Children’s
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develop the capacity to exercise their future liberty.” 177 This is the
best interest of the child. The courts must commit to this neverending balancing act that plays out in the courtroom. The state cannot
overlook the rights of the parents, nor can it overlook the rights of the
child in determining the best interest of the child. Even more so when
courts are asked to intervene, especially after the breakdown of the
family, courts must understand that there are individual rights
attributable to both parents and the child that must be taken into
consideration before they can impose what they deem to be in the
best interest of the child.
The job of the court is to protect rights and enforce laws. In
the context of the family, this protection does not come with a license
to intrude upon the family, thus violating the parents’ right to decide
how their child should be raised, unless necessary to protect the
rights of the child. 178 “Best interest” is the rights of the child. The
child’s parents, based upon their standards, values, and morals,
initially guide these rights. Governmental intrusion should only be
exercised to protect the child’s right to live free from parental abuse
or neglect that could cause harm to the child’s health, welfare, or
safety. 179 Based upon the authority of the court in balancing the
constitutional rights of the parents and child, it may override the
parental rights to protect the rights of the child when the parents’
duty is not being met. 180
Interpreting “best interest” as the constitutional rights of the
child protects the child and the family from government imposition
of its own standards and values upon the family. “As the Supreme
Court has stated, values, morality, and religion are things ‘the State
can neither supply nor hinder.’” 181 In order to assure that courts do
not infringe upon the rights of the family, a standard for the best
177
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interest of the child must be determined and applied in every
courtroom where these rights are being affected. Defining best
interest of a child as the constitutional rights of the child allows the
court to stay within its authority.
Family issues are complex and case-specific, but balancing
the rights of each family member provides some consistency to the
court’s involvement into the family. This assures the family that
decisions are made with as little personal judicial preference and with
an emphasis on the rights of all family members. The only time the
court should limit the rights of a parent is when those rights are
outweighed by the rights of the child, thus taking much of the
ambiguity out of what would be in the best interests of the child.

266

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/clrj/vol33/iss2/3

38

